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PROVIDING A SAFE HARBOR FOR THOSE WHO PLAY BY THE
RULES: THE CASE FOR A STRONG REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
DEFENSE
Richard C. Ausness*
H. Lee Barfield II
David A. King
Joshua R. Denton
Stephen J. Jasper
I. INTRODUCTION
On September 25, 2003, a fire broke out at the National Health Care (NHC)
nursing home facility in Nashville, Tennessee, causing sixteen deaths and a
number of injuries from smoke inhalation.' Thirty-two victims subsequently filed
suit against the nursing home, alleging that NHC was negligent for failing to install
sprinklers in its facility.2 This claim was made notwithstanding the fact that
applicable federal, state, and local safety regulations did not require the installation
of sprinklers in this particular type of building, and notwithstanding that the NHC
facility had been inspected by state fire inspectors just months before the fire and
was found to be in compliance with all requirements of the fire code. NHC
eventually settled these lawsuits in order to avoid the uncertainty and expense of
further litigation.
The NHC case illustrates how good-faith compliance with applicable safety
regulations provides businesses with almost no protection against potentially
devastating tort liability. The problem is with the legal rule that governs
compliance with government regulations. In effect, most courts treat a defendant's
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compliance with governmental regulations as evidence of due care, but allow the
jury to find that a defendant was negligent, notwithstanding his or her compliance
with legislative or administrative regulations.4 We shall refer to this as the
"traditional approach" to regulatory compliance.
The traditional approach originated in Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v.
Ives, 5 decided by the United States Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century.
6
Later, § 288C of the Second Restatement of Torts endorsed this version of the rule,
declaring -that compliance with safety regulations was not conclusive evidence that
a defendant exercised due care. 7 The American Law Institute is currently in the
process of drafting the Third Restatement of Torts, and the revised version of the
regulatory compliance defense is substantially similar to that of the Second
Restatement.
8
In our view, there are many problems with the traditional approach. First,
legislatures and administrative agencies have more expertise than lay juries when it
comes to determining efficient levels of safety, but the traditional approach allows
lay juries to second guess them. Second, under our constitutional system,
legislative bodies and administrative agencies, not courts, are responsible for
making resource allocation and other policy decisions. Therefore, courts should
accept the trade-offs that are often embodied in safety regulations instead of
allowing plaintiffs to use the litigation process to substitute their own policy
choices for those of legislative bodies and administrative agencies. Third, the
4 See, e.g., Tufariello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 458 F.3d 80, 91 (2d Cir. 2006)
(holding that railroad's compliance "with OSHA regulations regarding hearing
protection.., does not conclusively demonstrate that [it] was free from negligence");
Martinez de Jesus v. P.R. Elec. Power Auth., 256 F. Supp. 2d 122, 126-27 (D.P.R. 2003)
(declaring that compliance by electric utility with electric line clearances established by
National Electrical Safety Code does not entitle it to judgment as a matter of law); Bayer v.
Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc., 960 P.2d 70, 78-79 (Colo. 1998) (finding that
standards of conduct defined by statute, ordinance or regulation are usually minimum
standards that do not prevent a court from concluding that a reasonable person would take
additional precautions); Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 481 S.E.2d 518,
521 (Ga. 1997) (stating that compliance with federal automobile safety standards is merely
"a factor for the jury to consider in deciding" whether an automobile's design is defective
or not); Cronk v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 138 N.W.2d 843, 848 (Iowa 1965) (ruling that
electric utility's "compliance with the standards furnished by the National Electrical Safety
Code was not conclusive" on the question of whether it used due care in the location of
electric power lines); In re Flood Litig., 607 S.E.2d 863, 877 (W. Va. 2004) (concluding
that compliance with state and federal mining regulations "does not give rise to a
presumption that the landowner acted reasonably.., in his or her extraction and removal
activities").
' 144 U.S. 408 (1892).
6 See Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2049-
50 (2000).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 16 (Proposed
Final Draft 2007).
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traditional approach wrongly assumes that government safety regulations merely
set minimum standards, while, in reality, modem regulations typically reflect state-
of-the-art standards. Thus, by adding jury-created safety standards on top of
existing regulatory requirements, the traditional approach to regulatory compliance
adds to the cost of doing business without achieving significant safety gains.
Fourth, the traditional approach to regulatory compliance undermines the principle
of uniform application of regulatory standards. Because jury verdicts are seldom
consistent, business entities are often subjected to nonuniform safety "standards."
Finally, the traditional approach deters useful economic activity by imposing
potentially crushing tort liability upon those who have complied in good faith with
regulatory standards.
Part II of this Article examines the traditional approach to the regulatory
compliance defense, beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Grand Trunk
Railway Co. of Canada v. Ives, and proceeding to the Restatement (Second) §
288C and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 16. In
Part III, we discuss a number of cases that explicitly recognize a strong regulatory
compliance defense, as well as cases that achieve a similar objective by expressly
or impliedly applying the Second Restatement's § 16, comment (a) exception. Part
IV reviews some of the arguments that support a stronger regulatory compliance
defense. These include: (1) the institutional competence argument, (2) the
separation of powers argument, (3) the regulatory efficiency argument, (4) the
nonuniform standards argument, and (5) the overdeterrence argument. In Part V,
we focus on nursing home regulation to -see what impact a stronger regulatory
compliance defense would have on this socially useful industry. Finally, in Part VI,
we set forth a proposed alternative to the current version of Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 16.
II. ORIGINS OF THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
The traditional approach to regulatory compliance assumes that government
regulations establish only minimum standards of safety. 9 Consequently, courts
treat compliance with governmental regulations as merely evidence of due care
and allow a jury to hold a defendant negligent even though he or she has complied
with applicable legislative or administrative regulations. This approach was first
proposed by the United States Supreme Court in Grand Trunk Railway Co. of
Canada v. Ives and was later adopted by the drafters of the Second and Third
Restatement of Torts.' 0
9 See Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products
Liability Actions, 41 VAND. L. REv. 1121, 1135-36 (1988).
10 See supra notes 7-8.
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A. Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. Ives
One of the first cases to consider whether compliance with safety regulations
barred tort liability was Grand Trunk Railway Co. of Canada v. Ives, decided by
the Supreme Court in 1892.11 In that case, the decedent, Elijah Smith, and his wife
were struck and killed by a train at a railroad crossing in the city of Detroif.' 2 The
administrator of Mr. Smith's estate brought a negligence action against the
railroad, arguing that it should have placed a flagman at the crossing or provided
gates to protect travelers from oncoming trains.' 3 The jury found in favor of the
plaintiff and the defendant-railroad appealed. 14
One of the principal issues on appeal was the validity of a jury instruction
declaring that because the crossing was a busy one located in -a large city, the jury
could find that it was reasonable to expect the railroad company to provide
additional safeguards beyond those required by statute to protect persons using the
crossing. 15 The railroad contended that it was not required to take extra precautions
"because the whole subject of signals and flagmen, gates, etc., at crossings in
Michigan is regulated by statute."'' 6 According to the railroad, the statute provided
that the railroad commissioner was responsible for determining whether or not a
flagman should be posted at a particular railroad crossing.' 7 Thus, the railroad
argued that its failure to provide a flagman was not negligent unless the railroad
commissioner determined that one was necessary at the crossing where the
accident occurred. 18 In this case, the railroad commissioner had not ordered the
railroad to provide a flagman at this crossing.' 9
Responding to this argument, the Court reviewed a number of railroad
crossing cases,20 and determined that all of them supported the principle that the
duty of reasonable care might require railroad companies to do more than merely
"comply with all statutory requirements in the manner of signals, flagmen, and
other warnings of danger at public crossings.,,2' As the Court pointed out, "neither
the legislature nor railroad commissioners can arbitrarily determine in advance
what shall constitute ordinary care or reasonable prudence in a railroad company at
a crossing, in every particular case which may afterwards arise.', 22 Furthermore,
"144 U.S. 408 (1892).
12Id. at 411.
13id.
14Id. at 410.
'5 Id. at 419-20.
16 Id. at 422.
171id.
18Id.
19Id.
20 See id. at 423-27 (discussing three cases: Battishill v. Humphrey, 31 N.W. 894
(Mich. 1887); Guggenheim v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 33 N.W. 161 (Mich. 1887); and
Freeman v. Duluth, S. S. & A. Ry. Co., 41 N.W. 872 (Mich. 1889)).
21 Ives, 144 U.S. at 427.
22 Id.
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"each case must stand upon its own merits, and be decided upon its own facts and
circumstances."23 Accordingly, the Court upheld the trial court's jury instruction
that statutory compliance did not necessarily equal due care24 and affirmed the jury
verdict for the decedent.25
Legal commentators often identify Ives as the source of the traditional
approach to regulatory compliance.2 6 To be sure, there is language in the opinion
that is consistent with this approach. For example, the Court in Ives agreed with an
instruction that advised, the jury that it could find that the railroad company was
27negligent if it failed to adopt safeguards in addition to those required by statute.
The Court also declared that the railroad may be found negligent "even though it
may have complied literally with the terms of a statute prescribing" safety
requirements for railroad crossings.28
B. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C
Section 288C of the Second Restatement of Torts, published by the American
Law Institute in 1965, also adopted the traditional approach. The black letter text
of § 288C declares that "[c]ompliance with a legislative enactment or an
administrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence where a
reasonable man would take additional precautions. 29
However, comment (a) to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C contains
an important qualification to the general rule set forth in the black letter text of §
288C. Comment (a) declares:
Where a statute, ordinance or regulation is found to define a
standard of conduct for the purposes of negligence actions, as stated in
§§ 285 and 286, the standard defined is normally a minimum standard,
applicable to the ordinary situations contemplated by the legislation. This
legislative or administrative minimum does not prevent a finding that a
reasonable man would have taken additional precautions where the
situation is such as to call for them. Thus the enactment of an automobile
speed limit of forty miles an hour does not mean that the driver is free to
proceed always at that speed, and he may be required to slow down to
fifteen miles an hour, or even to stop, where traffic conditions require it.
Likewise the requirement that a hand signal be given by a driver who is
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 434.
26 See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 6; Ashley W. Warren, Compliance with Governmental
Regulatory Standards: Is It Enough to Immunize a Defendant from Tort Liability?, 49
BAYLOR L. REv. 763, 773-74 (1997); Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory
Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 180-82 (1989).
27 Ives, 144 U.S. at 420.
28 Id. at 420-21.
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
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about to make a left turn does not confer immunity upon a driver who
makes the signal but is otherwise negligent in making the turn, as by
cutting the comer; and where the driver has reason to know that his
signal has not been observed, or for some other reason is not sufficient,
he may be required to do more, as for example to blow his horn or to
refrain from making an immediate turn. Where there are no such special
circumstances, the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or
regulation may be accepted by the triers of fact, or by the court as a
matter of law, as sufficient for the occasion; but if for any reason a
reasonable man would take additional precautions, the provision does not
preclude a finding that the actor should do so.30
In other words, a court may determine that compliance with a regulatory or
statutory standard constitutes due care as a matter of law when there are no special
circumstances that would require the defendant to take additional precautions. 3'
Thus, in the absence of special circumstances, compliance with a regulatory
standard should constitute reasonable care. Unfortunately, the logic of this
interpretation has escaped many courts.
32
C. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 16
The Proposed Final Draft of § 16 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical Harm, which will replace the Restatement of Torts § 288C if
it is adopted by the American Law Institute, has retained the basic approach of the
Second Restatement.33 Section 16 (a) declares that "[a]n actor's compliance with a
pertinent statute, while evidence of nonnegligence, does not preclude a finding that
the actor is negligent under section 3 for failing to adopt precautions in addition to
those mandated by the statute.
' 34
Comment (c) states that a court may properly conclude that precautions
beyond those specified in a statute are called for "when the [regulation] does not
specifically address the safety problem at issue., 35 For example, a statute that
requires a motorist to signal before turning left is not relevant to the issue of
whether he or she is negligent in cutting the comer while making the left turn. 36 In
these circumstances, finding the motorist to be negligent, the court would not
30 Id. § 288C cmt. a.
3' See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at
233 (5th ed. 1984); Dueffert, supra note 26, at 186.
32 See supra note 4.
33 See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4(b) (1998). The
regulatory compliance provision in the Third Restatement on Products Liability is very
similar to § 16.
34 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 16(a)
(Proposed Final Draft 2007).351Id. § 16 cmt. c.
36 Id.
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question the legislative body's judgment in any way if the motorist's negligent act
were not addressed by the statute.37
Comment (d) points out that additional precautions also may be necessary
despite compliance with a safety regulation when the regulation "undertakes to
establish only minimum standards. 38 In requiring additional precautions, a court
recognizes that legislators intended to identify only some of the precautions that a
reasonable person would take.39
Comment (e) adds that additional precautions may be necessary "despite the
actor's compliance with the statute ... if the precaution relates to some unusual
situation beyond the generality of situations anticipated by the statute itself. 40 For
example, when a statute establishes. a highway speed limit of 55 miles per hour, it
is obviously related to determining what a safe vehicle speed should be when
highway conditions are ordinary. 41 "If adverse weather or heavy traffic makes
speeds as high as 55 miles per hour unwise, a finding that the motorist is negligent
who drives at 55 miles per hour does not call into question the general judgment
rendered by the legislature." 2
On the other hand, comment (f) declares that "[w]hen the statute directly
addresses the particular safety problem before the court, when the regulatory
scheme evidently seeks to identify all the precautions called for by the general
negligence [standard of reasonable care], and when the particular case involves no
unusual circumstances, the court may conclude that the [defendant's] compliance
with the statute shows that the [defendant was not negligent]." 3 This is particularly
true when the statute is thorough and comprehensive and when applying
compliance with the statute as a defense would impose "a uniform liability
standard [in order] to simplify litigation and provide parties with appropriate
guidance as to what precautions are expected of them." 4 As comment (f)
recognizes, in these circumstances, a safety regulation should set the standard of
care when the regulation is intended to be more than a minimum and when there
are no special circumstances in the case that might call for additional precautions. 5
This approach is analogous to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C comment
(a).46
37 Id.
38 Id. § 16 cmt. d.
39 Id.
40 Id. § 16 cmt. e.
41 id.
42 Id.
43 Id. § 16 cmt. f.
44Id.
45 Id.
46 Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965).
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III. OVERVIEW OF THE CASE LAW
Although a majority of courts have embraced the traditional approach to
regulatory compliance, a significant minority have given greater deference to
governmental safety standards in negligence cases. This Part examines: (A) cases
that explicitly recognize a strong regulatory compliance defense, (B) cases that
expressly apply the provisions of the Restatement (Second) § 288C comment (a),
and (C) cases that apply § 288C comment (a) by implication.
A. Cases Explicitly Holding That Compliance with a Regulatory Standard
Constitutes Reasonable Care
Some courts have held that compliance with a regulatory standard constitutes
due care as a matter of law.47 For example, in Leach v. Mountain Lake, the estate
of a man who drowned while attempting. to save another member of a boating party
brought a negligence action against the marina that rented the boat.48 The boat's
passengers included the decedent, a friend, and five children.49 While they were on
the lake, "a strong gust of wind rocked the boat" and caused one of the children to
fall into the water.50 The decedent drowned while attempting to rescue the child.5
The decedent's estate alleged, inter alia, that the marina was negligent for
failing to equip the boat with "boat hooks, ropes, and a ring life buoy" even though
these items were not required by statute.52 The trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant on this claim because it was reluctant to impose a duty
regarding navigational matters that differed from the standard of care that was
prescribed by those in charge of navigational policy. 53 The Eighth Circuit agreed,
47 E.g., Alvarado v. J.C. Penny Co., 713 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (D. Kan. 1989);
Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1 v. Gilbert, 725 P.2d 774, 776-779 (Colo. 1986); Josephson
v. Meyers, 429 A.2d 877, 880-81 (Conn. 1980); Teichman v. Potashnick Constr., Inc., 446
S.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Mo. 1969); see also Leach v. Mountain Lake, 120 F.3d 871, 873-74
(8th Cir. 1997); Sparks v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 287 So. 2d 654, 656 (La. Ct. App.
1973); cf Bernstein v. Reforzo, 379 A.2d 181, 186 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977) (finding
regulatory and industry standard intact where there were not any special circumstances that
required additional care); Leisy v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 40 N.W.2d 626, 629-30 (Minn. 1950)
(stating that "requirements prescribed by statute ... are specific and minimum
requirements, which may satisfy the requirements of due care, but not necessarily so");
Gigliotti v. N. Y., Chi. & St. Louis R.R. Co., 157 N.E.2d 447, 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958)
(noting that absent extraordinary hazards "there is no basis for requiring extrastatutory
warnings"). Contra Hostetler v. Consol. Rail Corp., 123 F.3d 387, 390-92 (6th Cir. 1997);
Sulpher Springs Valley Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Verdugo, 481 P.2d 511, 518-19 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1971).
48 Leach, 120 F.3d at 872-73.
49 Id. at 882.
50 id.
51 id.
52 Id. at 873-74.
53Id. at 874.
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declaring that "duty or ordinary care with respect to the proper equipment of boats
imposes no requirements beyond those enumerated in the pertinent statutes and
regulations.,
54
The New Jersey Supreme Court also applied a deferential view toward
governmental regulations in Contey v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. 55 In Contey,
the plaintiff was injured when she "missed an unmarked turn in the road and struck
a utility pole.",56 The pole stood about "ten inches from the curb line at the
beginning of an S-curve in the road., 57 The plaintiff sued the telephone company,
which owned the pole, the electric company, which had obtained "permission to
locate its wires on the pole," and various government entities.58 The trial court
dismissed the plaintiffs claim against the utility company, and the intermediate
appellate court affirmed.59 The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld the decision of
the lower courts.6 °
Although the court agreed that utility companies had a duty to foresee that
motorists might leave the traveled portion of the highway, it declared that
governmental bodies and highway planners were in the best position to determine
how utilities should satisfy that duty.61 "In this case, the ordinance required that the
utility place its poles within eighteen inches of the curb, presumably to facilitate
street lighting. 62 Although this requirement increased the risk of collisions-
indeed, "collisions with that [very pole] had occurred twice before"-the court felt
that the government entities, not the utility, should be held responsible for creating
this condition.63 Consequently, the court concluded that "[w]hen a public utility
has located its poles or structures within public rights-of-way in accordance with
the location and design authorized by the public body, the utility, in the absence of
countermanding directions from the public body, should have no further duty to
protect the motoring public. 6 4
A Colorado court engaged in a similar line of reasoning in Jefferson County
School District R-1 v. Gilbert.65 In that case, a kindergarten student and her parents
brought suit against a motorist, the school district, and the City of Arvada for
injuries that the student sustained from being struck by an automobile while
walking home from school. 66 Stop signs at the intersection where the accident
occurred required automobiles traveling north or south to stop but permitted east-
54 id.
" 643 A.2d 1005 (N.J. 1994).
56Id. at 1006.
57 id.
58 id.
59 id.
60Id. at 1010.
61 id.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1009-10.
64Id. at 1010.
65 725 P.2d 774 (Colo. 1986).
66 Id. at 774-75.
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67west traffic to proceed without stopping. In this case, the driver, who was
traveling north, stopped at the stop sign at the south side of the intersection, but
failed to yield the right-of-way and struck the schoolgirl in the northern
crosswalk.68
The plaintiffs "contended that the city was negligent in designing,
constructing and maintaining the intersection."69 In particular, they claimed the
intersection was "confusing and dangerous" and that it could have been made safer
by additional safety precautions, such as the installation of a traffic signal. 70 The
city moved for summary judgment, arguing "that the intersection ... and
crosswalks were designed and maintained in accordance with 'nationally
recognized engineering standards."' 71 The trial court agreed and granted summary
judgment, thereby provoking an appeal from the plaintiffs.72 The intermediate
appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision and this decision was in turn
upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court.73
The Colorado Supreme Court noted that the state highway department had
adopted the 1971 edition of the Federal Highway Administration's Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways (Manual) along with its
own 1975 supplement to the Manual.74 The Manual cautioned against installing
traffic signals at intersections except on the basis of an engineering study of the
location and identified eight situations that would warrant the installation of a
signal.75 In this case, the state highway department had found no evidence that
installation of a traffic signal was justified according to the criteria set forth in the
Manual.76 According to the court, "[b]ecause perfect safety is not realistically
attainable, local governments are required to achieve only a reasonable level of
safety in conformance with section 42-4-503(1) and the national engineering
standards set forth in the Manual., 77 Consequently, the Colorado Supreme Court
affirmed summary judgment for the city.
78
67 Id. at 775.
68 id.
69 id.
70 Id.
71 id.
72 id.
71 Id. at 779.
74 Id. at 777.
7' Id. at 779.
76 id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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B. Cases Expressly Applying the Second Restatement's Comment (a) Exception
A number of courts have expressly relied on comment (a) in their analysis of
regulatory compliance issues. 79 For example,- in Beatty v. Trailmaster Products,
Inc., the plaintiff, whose husband died after being involved in a motor vehicle
collision with a Ford Bronco, sued the manufacturer and distributors of a "lift kit"
that the Bronco's owner had used to raise the Bronco's front bumper from nineteen
inches above the ground to approximately twenty-four inches above the ground.8 °
The plaintiff alleged that the higher bumper caused the Bronco to ride up onto the
hood of her husband's Honda Civic, crushing the front part of the car, thus pinning
his legs in the driver's side footwell and ultimately causing his death.8'
The defendants contended that they should not be held liable because the
Bronco's bumper did not exceed the maximum height provided by a state statute.82
The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.83
The statute in question established "a maximum bumper height of twenty-eight
inches for multipurpose vehicles like the 1982 Bronco. 84 The defendants asserted
that the legislature, when it adopted this maximum bumper height standard,
"clearly contemplated possible hazards associated with disparate bumper heights in
vehicle collisions. 85 Furthermore, the defendants alleged that because "the
plaintiff 'failed to produce evidence of any special circumstances or dangers
beyond those addressed by the statute, compliance with the statute precludes a
finding of defect or negligence' as a matter of law.",
86
On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals agreed that the state legislature had
taken into account the danger posed by mismatched bumper collisions when it
adopted the bumper height statute in question. 7 The court also observed that "the
statutory scheme contemplate[d] varying bumper heights [among different] classes
of vehicles." 88 Thus, the court concluded, "the legislative scheme plainly
contemplates that bumper mismatch between different classes of vehicles is an
inevitable occurrence and, as such, sanctioned by the legislature as a matter of
public policy. '89 The Maryland court acknowledged that "compliance with a
79 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 172 (Cal. 1993); Jones v. Hittle
Serv., Inc., 549 P.2d 1383, 1389 (Kan. 1976); Beatty v. Trailmaster Prod., Inc., 625 A.2d
1005, 1014 (Md. 1993); Montgomery v. Royal Motel, 645 P.2d 968, 970 (Nev. 1982)
(pointing to statutory enactments as a minimum standard, though additional precautions
may be necessary), withdrawn, 660 P.2d 114 (Nev. 1983).
80 Beatty, 625 A.2d at 1007-08.81 id.
82 Id. at 1008.
83Id. at 1010.
84 Id. at 1008.
85 Id.
86 Id. (quoting the defendant's motion for summary judgment).
87Id. at 1013.
88 Id. at 1013-14.89 Id. at 1014.
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statute [would not] preclude a finding of negligence [in cases] where a reasonable
person would take extra precautions." 90 However, the court also pointed out that
the Restatement's comment (a), as well as a number of other cases, had declared
that, "where no special circumstances require extra caution, a court may find that
conformity to the statutory standard amounts to due care as a matter of law."
91
Based on this analysis, and because the court found that there were no special
circumstances in the case before it that would prevent the application of the
statutory standard as a matter of law, the court affirmed the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of the defendants. 92
Similarly, the Kansas Supreme Court followed comment (a)'s approach in
Jones v. Hittle Service, Inc.9 3 Jones arose out of a propane gas explosion that killed
three people.94 The underground line that supplied liquefied propane gas to one of
the plaintiffs' buildings apparently developed a leak, and the explosion occurred
when one of the victims lit a cigarette.95 The plaintiffs argued that the defendants
were negligent because they had not put a sufficient amount of odorant in the gas.96
Responding to this argument, the Supreme Court of Kansas noted that the
Kansas state fire marshal was statutorily authorized to make rules and regulations
for the storage, use, manufacture, and sale of petroleum products and inflammable
fluids.9 7 Pursuant to this authority, in 1966, the state fire marshal promulgated a
regulation that established a standard of one pound of ethyl mercaptan odorant per
10,000 gallons of liquefied petroleum gas. 98 This standard was taken verbatim
from the National Fire Protection Association's Standard No. 58.99 The parties
agreed that the gas supplied by the defendants complied with this standard.1 00
The defendants contended that compliance with the regulatory standard on
odorant levels conclusively established that they were not negligent and that the
gas was not defective as far as the level of odorization was concerned. 10' Citing the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C, the court rejected the proposition that
compliance with government safety regulations was a complete defense to
negligence. °2 However, relying on comment (a), 0 3 the court declared that
compliance with regulatory standards was "evidence of due care" and "may be
9 0 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
9' 549 P.2d 1383 (Kan. 1976).
94 Id. at 1387.
95 Id. at 1387-88.
96Id. at 1388.
97 Id. at 1389 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 31-207 (1966)).
98 Id. (citing KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 22-8-2 (1966)).
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id.
1
02 Id.
103 See id.
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conclusive in the absence of a showing of special circumstances." 0 4 Furthermore,
the court agreed that "a manufacturer should be able to rely on such standards in
the absence of actual or constructive notice that they are inadequate."' 5
Although the plaintiffs' expert witness argued that the odorant level required
by the state regulation was insufficient, he did not support his opinion with any
empirical data. 10 6 The court rejected this unfounded opinion and declared that the
regulatory requirement established the appropriate standard of care.'0 7 Specifically,
the court stated:
We do not think a reasonable jury could give credence to plaintiffs'
expert opinion testimony on this issue when set against the universally
accepted legislative standard. There were no special circumstances here
in the Smiths' proposed use of the gas which would have put the sellers
on notice that more odorant than usual would be required. Neither had
there been any industry-wide or individual corporate experience showing
that the legislative standard was inadequate.1
0 8
Accordingly, the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of
the defendants.109
Finally, in.Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.," 0 the California Supreme Court relied
upon § 288C, comment (a) to make a thoughtful and persuasive argument in favor
of greater judicial deference to regulatory decision making. In that case, the
plaintiff, a four-month-old child, brought suit against the manufacturer of a
children's aspirin product for failing to include Spanish-language warnings on the
bottle. ' The plaintiff alleged that he contracted Reye's Syndrome after consuming
the defendant's aspirin." 12 The defendant's aspirin packages contained a warning in
English about the symptoms and risks of Reye's Syndrome. 13 However, the
plaintiffs mother could not read English, and she was allegedly not aware of the
risk of Reye's Syndrome." l4 The trial court granted summary judgment in the
defendant's favor; however, this decision was reversed by the intermediate
appellate court.' 5 On appeal, the California Supreme Court reinstated the trial
court's judgment in favor of the defendants.' 16
'°4Id. at 1390.
105 Id.
106 id.
'°7 Id at 1390-91.
' 8 Id. at 1391.
109Id. at 1396.
10 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993).
"'. Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 170.
3 1d. at 169.
114 Id. at 169-70.
115 Id. at 170.
116Id. at 178.
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In arriving at its decision, the California Supreme Court observed that the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) extensively regulated aspirin and other
nonprescription drugs.' 17 The court noted that the FDA regulation pertinent to the
plaintiffs claims required that manufacturers provide full English labeling for
nonprescription drugs, but it did not require labeling in any other language except
for drugs "'distributed solely in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or in a
Territory where the predominant language is one other than English .... ,,,i 18 The
court noted that California's regulations for nonprescription drug labeling had
similar requirements." 9
The defendant argued that "the standard of care for packaging and labeling
nonprescription drugs, and in particular the necessity or propriety of foreign-
language label and package warnings, has been appropriately fixed by the dense
layer of state and federal statutes and regulations that control virtually all aspects
of the marketing of its products."'12 In response to this argument, the court
observed that compliance with regulatory standards did not ordinarily preclude a
finding that a reasonable person would take additional precautions under certain
circumstances, the court acknowledged that
there is some room in tort law for a defense of statutory compliance.
Where the evidence shows no unusual circumstances, but only the
ordinary situation contemplated by the statute or administrative rule, then
"the minimum standard prescribed by the legislation or regulation may
be accepted by the triers of fact, or by the court as a matter of law, as
sufficient for the occasion. . .
The court went on to say that defining the circumstances under which warnings or
other information should be provided in a foreign language was "a task for which
legislative and administrative bodies are particularly well suited."'' 22 The court also*
noted that the California Legislature had "already performed this task in a variety
of different contexts, enacting laws to ensure that California residents are not
denied important services or exploited because they lack proficiency in
English."' 2 This, according to the court, suggested that the Legislature and FDA
had "deliberately chosen not to require that manufacturers also include warnings in
foreign languages."124The court concluded by declaring:
To preserve that uniformity and clarity [desired by the FDA in
nonprescription drug warnings], to avoid adverse impacts upon the
7 1d. at 173.
118 Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 201.15(c)(1) (1993)).
19 Id. at 174 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25900 (1993)).
"2°Id. at 172-73.
121 Id. at 172 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C cmt. a (1965)).
' 22Id. at 174.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 175.
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warning requirements mandated by the federal regulatory scheme, and in
deference to the superior technical and procedural lawmaking resources
of legislative and administrative bodies, we adopt the legislative/
regulatory standard of care that mandates nonprescription drug package
warnings in English only.
125
C. Cases Implicitly Applying the Second Restatement's Comment (a)
Exception
Other courts have followed the reasoning of § 288C comment (a) without
actually mentioning it by name. 126 For example, in Josephson v. Meyers, the
plaintiff was injured when she was struck by an automobile while attempting to
cross a four-lane parkway after exiting a school bus. 127 She alleged that the
operator of the school bus was negligent in discharging the plaintiff on the north
side of the parkway where she had to cross four lanes of traffic, when he could
have discharged her on the south side of the parkway and avoided this risk. 128 The
trial court's charge to the jury removed this theory of negligence from its
consideration.129 This decision was affirmed on appeal.13
0
In support of its decision to affirm the trial court's jury instructions, the,
Connecticut Supreme Court pointed out that the school bus operator complied with
the requirements of a state statute entitled "Operators' Duties on Stopping Bus."'
31
After making this observation, the Court declared,. "Although it is true that
compliance with a statute does not necessarily preclude a finding of negligence,
where the facts are similar to those contemplated by the statute and no special
circumstances or dangers are present, a defendant satisfies his duty of care by
complying with the statute."'
132
The court went on to note that the statutory scheme entitled "Operators'
Duties on Stopping Bus" specifically contemplated that "students [leaving] a
school bus may have to cross the road in order to get home."'133 Moreover,
according to the court, the plaintiff had failed to offer any evidence to prove that,
"at the time of the accident there were any unusual circumstances which would
[have required the driver] to deviate from his assigned route.' 34 Therefore, the
121Id. at 177.
126 See, e.g., Josephson v. Meyers, 429 A.2d 877, 880-881 (Conn. 1980); Leisy v. N.
Pac. Ry. Co., 40 N.W.2d 626, 629-30 (Minn. 1950); Contey v. N.J. Bell Tel. Co., 643 A.2d
1005, 1009-1010 (N.J. 1994); Gigliotti v. N.Y., Chi. & St. Louis R.R. Co., 157 N.E.2d
447, 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
127 Josephson, 429 A.2d at 878-79.
128 Id. at 879-80.
129 Id.
"3o Id. at 883.
131 Id. at 880 n.4 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-277 (1980)).
132 Id. at 880-81.
133 Id. at 881.
13 4 Id.
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court concluded, compliance with the statutory requirements was sufficient to
satisfy the school bus operator's duty of care, and the trial court was correct in
taking this issue away from the jury. 1
35
In railroad crossing cases, various courts have held that a railroad satisfies its
duty of reasonable care when it complies with regulatory requirements relating to
warning devices and other safety precautions at railroad crossings. 36 These cases
have declared that additional protective measures are required only if a crossing is
"extra-hazardous," that is, more dangerous than an ordinary crossing. 137
Gigliotti v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co. illustrates this
principle. 138 In Gigliotti, the plaintiff was injured when his automobile struck a
diesel locomotive train at an intersection. 139 The jury awarded damages to the
plaintiff and the railroad company appealed. 40 The accident occurred at 4:00 a.m.
at a crossing that serviced a municipal waterworks plant.' 41 The locomotive
engineer "stopped at the plant entrance" and after looking 2000 -feet down the
highway and "seeing no traffic," proceeded into the intersection at a slow rate of
speed. 142 The plaintiff, traveling at a speed "of from 40 to 43 miles an hour," did
not see the locomotive until it was too late to avoid colliding with it. 
143
The plaintiff alleged that the railroad company was negligent because it failed
to "post a watchman at the highway crossing [to] warn approaching traffic" that a
train was about to cross the intersection. 144 The court, however, rejected this claim
of negligence:
Under specification of negligence ... it does not appear that any
statute or order of the Public Utilities Commission of this state required a
watchman or any other warning than that of the crossbuck sign (which
was in proper place) for the crossing in question; and, in the absence of
such requirement, "there is ordinarily * * * no duty on a railroad to
provide extrastatutory warnings at a grade crossing, where no order of
the Public Utility Commission has provided for such warnings, if a driver
in the exercise of ordinary care should be able, to avoid colliding with a
135 Id.
136 E.g., Leisy v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 40 N.W.2d 626, 629-30 (Minn. 1950); Gigliotti v.
N. Y., Chi. & St. Louis R.R. Co., 157 N.E.2d 447, 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958).
137 E.g., Hostetler v. Consol. Rail Corp., 123 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir. 1997); Leisy, 40
N.W.2d at 630 (Minn. 1950); Hood v. N.Y., Chi. & St. Louis R.R. Co., 144 N.E.2d 104
(Ohio 1957) (using term "extremely hazardous"); Gigliotti, 157 N.E.2d at 451 (using term
"more than ordinarily hazardous").
138 Gigliotti, 157 N.E.2d at 447.
139 Id. at 449.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 450.
142 Id.
143 Id.
'44 Id. at 451.
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train that is being operated over the crossing in compliance with statutory
requirements.14
5
In this case, the court determined that the crossing at the time of the accident
"possessed no features which would make it more than ordinarily hazardous, and,
under such circumstances, there was no basis" for claiming that the railroad had a
duty under general negligence principles to provide additional warnings.1
46
Consequently, the court reversed the lower court's decision and held in favor of the
railroad. 147
The Supreme Court of Minnesota reached a similar conclusion in Leisy v.
Northern Pacific Railway Co. 148 In that case, the plaintiff and his daughter were
injured when their automobile struck the defendant's train at a crossing.1 49 The
crossing was located in "a sparsely settled woods and lake region, [and] cross-buck
signs" were clearly visible at least 400 feet from the tracks. 5 ° At trial, the judge
refused to instruct the jury that it might take into account "the failure of the
defendant to have a flagman at the crossing or to maintain gates, automatic
signaling devices," or other warning devices at the crossing "for the protection of
persons approaching the tracks on the road. " 5i 1 The jury reached a verdict in the
railroad company's favor.'
52
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that there is no hard
and fast rule in railroad crossing cases for determining whether statutory
requirements constitute due care or whether additional precautions are required.
53
Furthermore, the court declared, where the evidence permits conflicting inferences
of fact as to whether or not reasonable care required a railroad to take additional
precautions, the question is one of fact for the jury. 54 However, the court added,
"where the evidence permits only the inference that such additional precautions
were not necessary in the exercise of due care, the question is one of law for the
court, and in such a case the question should not be submitted to the jury."' 55 In
this case, the court concluded that compliance with statutory safety standards
constituted due care as a matter of law:
145 id.
146 id.
147 Id. at 454.
148 40 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1950).
1491 Id. at 627.
15o Id. at 627-28.
151 Id. at 629.
152 id.
153 Id. ("Requirements prescribed by statute, or by administrative order under
statutory authorization, are specific and minimum requirements, which may satisfy the
requirements of due care, but not necessarily so; and where they do not, the actor must take
such additional precautions as due care may require.").
154 id.
155 Id.
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Due care did not require that defendant exercise any precautions at
the crossing in addition to those prescribed by statute. In the country,
where but a few persons pass over the tracks each day and where there
are no interferences with hearing and sight, compliance with statutory
requirements suffices. Extra or additional care must be exercised at what
are called "extrahazardous," or "peculiarly" and "unusually" dangerous
crossings. Here, the evidence not only did not permit an inference of fact
that the crossing was extrahazardous or peculiarly and unusually
dangerous so as to require that precautions additional to the statutory
minima be exercised, but, on the contrary, compelled as a matter of law.
decision that the crossing was not such.
156
Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the lower court's judgment for
the defendant. 1
57
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR A STRONGER REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
DEFENSE
For years, legal scholars have debated the proper relationship between
government safety standards and tort law. Those who believe that courts should
give greater deference to government safety standards generally make the
following arguments: (1) legislatures and administrative agencies have greater
expertise than courts in determining appropriate levels of public safety; (2) under
our constitutional structure, the legislative and executive branches of government,
and not the courts, are supposed to make important safety and risk allocation
decisions; (3) because modem safety regulations typically embody optimal rather
than minimum standards, superimposing tort law standards on top of existing
regulatory requirements produces only minimal safety gains and often imposes
great costs upon the regulated activity and upon society at large; (4) greater
deference to government safety standards in negligence cases will promote fairness
and uniform enforcement; and (5) providing a safe harbor for those who comply
with government safety regulations offsets the tendency of tort law to overdeter
activities that are socially useful but inherently risky. Each of these arguments will
be discussed below in more detail.
A. The Institutional Competence Argument
The first, and most powerful, argument for greater judicial deference to
regulatory standards is that legislative bodies and regulatory agencies are better
equipped than courts to formulate effective safety standards. 158 This argument
'
56 Id. at 629-30 (citations omitted).
157 Id. at 630.
158 See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk
Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 334-35 (1985).
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relies on the fact that legislatures and administrative agencies usually employ
professional staffs with the educational qualifications, training, and experience to
understand the technical and economic aspects of safety regulation.
5 9
Furthermore, when necessary, these staff members can also obtain assistance
by commissioning studies or by soliciting advice from outside experts. 160 In
addition, public hearings give the staff additional access to information and
opinion. These hearings permit government officials, industry representatives,
consumer groups, and ordinary members of the public to express their desires and
concerns about proposed regulations. With the benefit of this input, legislators and
administrators are better able to take into account a wide variety of interests when
they formulate safety standards.
161
Just as federal administrative agencies are usually well-equipped to develop
state of the art safety standards, state and local agencies also have the capacity to
formulate optimal standards. Even when they lack the resources and expertise of
their federal counterparts, state and local regulators can look to national or
consensus safety standards developed by testing laboratories such as Underwriters'
Laboratories, professional associations such as the American Society for
Mechanical Engineers or the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
nonprofit membership organizations such as National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA), the American Society for Testing and Materials, and other standards-
writing organizations such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). 1
62
For the most part, these national or consensus standards are optimal or state-of-the-
art, not minimum, safety Standards.1
63
In contrast, courts are not well suited to evaluate safety regulations,
particularly if they involve technical issues or economic trade-offs. 164 In the first
place, judges, and especially juries, seldom have the educational background and
training to understand and evaluate technical or scientific data. 165 Second, because
courts do not have independent investigative powers, they must rely on whatever
information litigants choose to provide. Since, parties to a lawsuit have no
159 For example, the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) has a
staff of more than 1700 physicians, toxicologists, pharmacologists, epidemiologists,
chemists, and statisticians to ensure the safety of prescription drugs, biologics and medical
devices. See Daniel Carpenter & A. Mark Fendrick, Accelerating Approval Times for New
Drugs in the U.S., 15 REG. AFF. J. 411, 411-17 (2004), available at http://people.hmdc.
harvard.edu/-dcarpent/acceleration-raj.pdf.
160 See Warren, supra note 26, at 804-05; Steven L. Holley, Note, The Relationship
Between Federal Standards and Litigation in the Control ofAutomobile Design, 57 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 804, 819 (1982).
161 See Huber, supra note 158, at 331.
162 See Robert W. Hamilton, Prospects for the Nongovernmental Development of
Regulatory Standards, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 455, 461 (1983).
163 Id. at 462-64. See also infra Part V.A (discussing consensus standards in the Life
Safety Code).
164 See Huber, supra note 158, at 334-35.
165 See id. at 319-20.
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incentive to disclose anything that does not support their position, courts are forced
to evaluate safety standards on the basis of limited information.166 Finally, because
the litigation process is case specific in nature, courts tend to focus on the narrow
issues before them and ignore the broader economic or social concerns that may be
involved in setting safety standards.
167
The silicone breast implant litigation and the Bendectin cases illustrate some
of the problems that bedevil courts and juries when they try to resolve safety issues
entirely on their own. In the silicone breast implant controversy, for example,
juries awarded damages to plaintiffs despite the fact that no epidemiological
studies or literature reviews found any causal connection between implants and
connective tissue or autoimmune disease in patients. 168 In her book, Science on
Trial, Marcia Angell details how courts failed in the breast implant cases to
exclude "junk science," and how jurors in these cases failed to understand basic
concepts of scientific causation. 69 Similarly, in a group of cases involving the
prescription drug Bendectin, courts allowed plaintiffs' expert witnesses to base
their testimonies on what is now commonly recognized as junk science when
orthodox epidemiological studies failed to support their causation claims. 1
70
B. The Separation of Powers Argument
Another argument for greater judicial deference to government safety
regulations is based on the constitutional principle of separation of powers. In the
United States, legislative bodies and administrative agencies are supposed to
formulate regulatory policy. Courts have a very limited role in this process: they
can interpret statutory language, they can invalidate legislation or administrative
regulations when those violate constitutional or statutory provisions, and they can
review the decisions of administrative agencies when authorized to do so by state
or federal administrative procedure acts. But when courts reject a safety standard
166 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits ofAdjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1532-33 (1973).
167 See W. Kip Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 8-9 (1991)
("Unfortunately, the courts are not regulatory agencies and do not have the expertise to set
safety levels, especially since they must act within the narrow perspective of a particular
case."). In holding that the Medical Device Amendments preempted common-law tort
claims, the United States Supreme Court recently declared that "[a] jury ... sees only the
cost of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits; the patients who
reaped those benefits are not represented in court." Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
999, 1008 (2008).
168 See Rabin, supra note 6, at 2061-62.
169 MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE
LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 111-125 (1996).
170 JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL: A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION 91-
116 (1998). See generally MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE
CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996) (discussing the lack of
epidemiological studies to link birth defects to Bendectin).
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that has been formulated by a government agency, they assume the power to make
risk-allocation decisions that have been entrusted to other branches of
government.'71 In effect, litigants who urge courts to impose a higher standard of
care on an activity seek to challenge legislative or administrative policy decisions
without going through the procedures set forth in federal or state administrative
procedure acts. 172 In contrast, a strong regulatory compliance defense will promote
the proper constitutional balance of power by protecting legislative and
administrative decisions against encroachment by the judiciary.
C. The Regulatory Efficiency Argument
A third argument for a stronger regulatory compliance defense posits that a
public risk-management regime that incorporates both administrative and tort-
based safety standards is likely to be inefficient. Under the current regulatory
regime, most activities are subject to two sources of regulation and two sets of
regulatory standards. 173 Legislative and administrative regulations establish a
"floor" of required conduct in the sense that those who violate these standards will
be subject to fines or criminal penalties, while tort law imposes a standard of care
that is equal to or higher than the governmental standard. 174 If the standard of care
established by government regulation is in fact a minimum standard, there may be
a significant difference between it and the standard of care mandated by tort law.
In those circumstances, the accident cost reduction savings that result from
enforcement of more rigorous tort law standards may be worth the increased
expense of maintaining a dual system of regulation. However, if there is no
significant difference between the standard of care required by regulation and that
required by tort law, superimposing tort-based safety standards on top of existing
government regulation is not likely to be cost-effective because the additional
reduction in accident costs attributable to marginally higher tort law standards will
not exceed the costs of implementing them. 
175
171 See Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2153 (2000).
172 See Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability:
Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167, 2178 (2000).
173 See Dueffert, supra note 26, at 177.
174 Id. at 176.
175 See Richard C. Ausness, The Case for a "Strong" Regulatory Compliance
Defense, 55 MD. L. REV. 1210, 1257-66 (1996). This logic also supports a ban on punitive
damages when a defendant has complied with applicable safety standards if these standards
are optimal or close to optimal. The arguments against punitive damages are discussed
infra at Part VI.D.
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D. The Uniformity Argument
According to this argument, a strong regulatory compliance defense will
promote a fairer and more uniform application of government safety standards.
176
Without a strong policy of judicial deference to regulatory standards, some
defendants who comply with applicable safety standards will nevertheless be found
negligent, while others will escape liability. This lack of uniform treatment is
unfair to litigants and undermines the deterrent effect of tort law.
Furthermore, because jury verdicts in negligence cases can be highly
unpredictable, without the safe harbor provided by a strong regulatory compliance
defense, individuals and business entities who comply with applicable safety
standards can have no assurance ex ante that a lay jury will not conclude that they
should have taken additional precautions. This is demoralizing to those who seek
to "play by the rules" and undermines respect for the legal system. On the other
hand, a strong regulatory compliance defense will provide more predictability for
those who engage in socially useful, risky activities. In addition, these individuals
and businesses might have an additional incentive to comply with regulatory
standards if they know that compliance will relieve them of tort liability.
77
E. The Overdeterrence Argument
The final rationale for a more robust regulatory compliance defense assumes
that vague or inconsistent tort standards place an excessive burden on activities
that are socially useful but inherently risky. 178 Faced with the prospect of
substantial damage awards (including punitive damages in some cases), businesses
either devote excessive resources to safety, and devote correspondingly fewer
resources to mote productive alternative uses, or they shift their resources into
activities where there is less exposure to tort liability. 79 In some cases, fear of
massive litigation costs may overdeter even when adverse damage awards are
unlikely. 180 The experience of the pharmaceutical industry illustrates how the fear
of tort liability can lead to overdeterrence. 18 1 For example, in the 1970s, many
-176 See e.g.,Warren, supra note 26, at 805-06 (discussing and rejecting the uniformity
argument).
177 See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the
Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 483 (1997).
178 See Warren, supra note 26, at 780 (noting that a "manufacturer must face often
unpredictable liability for negligence in manufacturing, design, or behavior").
179 See 2 ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 86-89 (Reporters' Study 1991). But see Rabin, supra
note 6, at 2077-78 (arguing that there is no recent empirical evidence available to support
overdeterrence claims with respect to pharmaceuticals).
180 Rabin, supra note 6, at 2075.
181 See Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for
Failure To Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits from Driving
Good Drugs off the Market, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 413, 415 (1990); Charles J. Walsh &
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pharmaceutical companies stopped producing vaccines for childhood diseases.'
82
The few remaining companies that continued to produce vaccines were forced to
charge much higher prices for their products because they needed to set aside
money as a reserve against potential damage awards. 183 The Bendectin litigation
provides another example of overdeterrence. The manufacturer of Bendectin
stopped producing the antinausea drug after defense costs exceeded $100 million,
causing liability insurers to deny insurance. 184 Insurers were justifiably concerned
about massive tort liability even though FDA studies had concluded that the drug
was safe and should not be withdrawn from the market.'
8 5
The prospect of tort liability also caused a sharp decrease in the production of
general aviation aircraft in the 1980s. 186 In the late 1970s, twenty-nine
manufacturers produced 14,000 light piston airplanes per year, but by 1993, only
nine manufacturers were left, and they produced only a total of 900 aircraft. 187 The
industry did not recover until Congress enacted the General Aviation
Revitalization Act (GARA)' 88 in 1994 to provide airplane manufacturers with
some protection against tort liability. 189 This legislation has enabled the general
aviation industry to rebound during the past decade. 190
As the history of general aviation shows, government regulations can provide
an important "safe harbor" for business enterprises when courts recognize
regulatory compliance as a defense. 19 1 Instead of having to predict what tort law
standard a court will adopt in the future, a business entity will know in advance
that it will not be held liable in a subsequent tort action if it complies with
Marc S. Klein, The Conflicting Objectives of Federal and State Tort Law Drug Regulation,
41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 171, 177 (1986).
182 Huber, supra note 158, at 287-90.
183 Tim Moore, Comment, Comment K Immunity to Strict Liability: Should All
Prescription Drugs Be Protected?, 26 Hous. L. REV. 707, 718 (1989).
184 Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting
the Dual- Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167, 2171-72 (2000).
185 Richard A. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
645, 648 (1985).
186 Timothy S. McCallister, A "Tail" of Liability Reform: General Aviation
Revitalization Act of 1994 & the General Aviation Industry in the United States, 23
TRANSP. L.J. 301, 305-07 (1995).
187 Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The General Aviation Revitalization Act: How
Rational Civil Justice Reform Revitalized an Industry, 67 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1269, 1273-74
(2002).
188 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006).
189 DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 14.5 (2005) (describing the
provisions of GARA).
190 See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 187, at 1283-84.
'9' Ausness, supra note 175, at 1218.
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applicable government safety standards that are prospective in nature and where
there are no special circumstances in the case.
92
F. Arguments Against a Strong Regulatory Compliance Defense
Notwithstanding the arguments discussed above, some legal commentators
object to a broad rule that would recognize compliance with government standards
as a defense to tort liability. 93 For example, some critics claim that government
safety regulations are often inadequate and cite as examples of regulatory failure
the former federal fabric flammability standard, 194 and the FDA's licensing of
dangerous drugs.' 95 In their view, tort liability is necessary to protect public safety
because government standards are often minimal in nature. 1
96
There is probably no way to prove conclusively whether this argument is
valid or not. Much of the evidence on this issue is anecdotal and decades old.
Moreover, examples of one agency's failures do not prove that all, or even most,
government standards are inadequate. On the other hand, many safety standards
reflect consensus or national standards or are adopted by an agency after formal
rulemaking procedures. At the federal level, these include safety standards
promulgated by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), OSHA, the
FDA, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the FAA.' 97 State and local
building codes, electrical and plumbing codes, and fire protection standards are
also likely to be state-of-the-art when they are developed by national professional
standard-setting organizations. Finally, it is important to distinguish between the
adequacy of safety standards and the effectiveness of their enforcement. We
believe that concerns about inadequate enforcement are not relevant to the issue of
whether courts should recognize a strong regulatory compliance defense. The
defense is only available to those who actually comply with applicable safety
standards. If the defendant complied with these standards, it should not matter that
others have not.
192 Even if a strong regulatory compliance defense does not discourage potential
plaintiffs from bringing lawsuits, it may induce them to settle prior to trial. See Warren,
supra note 26, at 798.
193 See, e.g., Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42
AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1340-41 (1993); Warren, supra note 26, at 807.
194 See David C. Campbell & John F. Vargo, The Flammable Fabrics Act and Strict
Liability in Tort, 9 IND. L. REV. 395, 403 (1976) (declaring "that some plaintiffs experts
have demonstrated that ordinary toilet tissue will pass the.., test").
195 See Schwartz, supra note 193, at 1347-52 (discussing eleven instances in which
the FDA licensed dangerous pharmaceutical products); Daniel W. Sigelman, Turning the
Tables on Drug Companies, 30 TRIAL, Mar. 1994, at 72, 72 (citing various examples of
FDA failure to discover drug-related risks during the licensing process).
196 Warren, supra note 26, at 807.
197 For a brief description of fede:al regulatory statutes, see Ausness, supra note 175,
at 1214-17.
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A second argument suggests that systemic problems in the regulatory process
virtually ensure that government regulation will not be wholly effective. One
problem is lack of adequate resources. Government regulators are said to be
chronically underfunded and, therefore, lack the necessary resources to do their job
properly. 198 Underfunding was particularly common in the 1980s and early 1990s.
As one commentator declared, "[t]he systematic hostility to regulation that
characterized the last few presidential administrations effectively gutted many
agencies of resources and sapped their political will."' 199 Another commentator has
described how budgetary cutbacks hampered the FDA and the CPSC during this
period.200 While adequate funding is always a problem, it appears that federal
agencies have more resources now than they did in the 1980s. 20 Furthermore, in
our opinion, when underfunding exists, it is more likely to adversely affect
enforcement efforts than the development of safety standards.
Agencies are also allegedly dependent upon industry sources for essential
information about risks and safety technology.0 2 As a result, the argument goes,
safety standards promulgated by these agencies tend to represent only the
industry's view about acceptable levels of safety.0 3 It is no doubt true that some
regulatory agencies rely heavily on regulated industries for technical information.
However, these agencies also employ professional staffs who can evaluate and
verify this information and who often have the ability to obtain additional
information from independent sources when necessary.0 4
Another argument against the adoption of a strong regulatory compliance
defense is based on the phenomenon known as agency capture, where special
interests exercise so much influence over an agency that its safety regulations
benefit the regulated industry instead of the public.20 5 The risk of agency capture is
exacerbated by the "revolving door" between regulatory agencies and private
198 See Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the
Specter of Tort Liability, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 1026, 1048-49 (1989).
199 Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspectives on
Tort Reform, 72 N.C.L. REV. 1129, 1181 (1994).
200 Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1157-58.
201 For example, the FDA has received additional funding from the Prescription Drug
User Fee Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 379(g)-(h) (2006).
202 See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1147 ("Industry often controls indispensable data
about the nature and extent of the safety problem that an agency is attempting to address, as
well as information about the technology and costs of reducing or eliminating the risk.").
203 Carl Tobias, Great Expectations and Mismatched Compensation: Government
Sponsored Public Participation in Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1103 (1986).
204 For example, the FDA can call upon the Centers for Disease Control, the National
Academy of Sciences, the Federation of American Societies for Experimental Biology, and
other scientific organizations to assist it with compiling and reviewing research submitted
to it by drug companies. See Noah, supra note 171, at 2161.
205 See Andrew E. Costa, Negligence Per Se Theories in Pharmaceutical & Medical
Device Litigation, 57 ME. L. REV. 51, 87 (2005); Anita Johnson, Products Liability
"'Reform ". A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C. L. REV. 677, 687 (1978).
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employers which encourage agency personnel to promote the interests of regulated
industries in order to enhance their prospects of future employment in the private
sector.2°6 Furthermore, even if a regulatory agency is not captured by special
interests, it may be pressured to lower safety standards by politicians in the
legislative or executive branch.2 °7
However, we are skeptical of the claim that regulated parties could acquire
sufficient influence over a regulatory agency to dictate its regulatory program.
Obviously, regulated businesses will seek to put their views before the agency, just
as they do before legislative bodies and the general public. Nevertheless, no matter
how much influence particular businesses have with a regulatory agency,
competitors, consumer groups, and other governmental entities can counteract this
and are in a position to closely scrutinize agency behavior for signs of improper
behavior.20 8 Indeed, a regulated business probably has less influence over a
legislative body or a regulatory agency than a plaintiff's expert witness has over
jurors in a trial.
Another concern with a strong regulatory compliance defense is that
regulatory standards often become obsolete with the passage of time.20 9 This
occurs because agencies are not always able to respond quickly to new information
or advances in safety technology due to inadequate resources. 210 For example, lack
of resources contributed to National Highway Traffic Safety, Administration's
failure to revise many motor vehicle safety standards in the 1970s.211 In other
cases, updating obsolete standards is delayed by the rulemaking process itself. For
example, it took the CPSC many years to adopt a new safety standard for walk-
behind power lawn mowers.212
We acknowledge that the issue of obsolete standards is a legitimate one. In
many areas, safety standards issued by agencies lag behind technological
developments, particularly when existing standards must be changed by lengthy
rulemaking proceedings. However, we believe that ignoring regulatory compliance
simply because some safety standards may be obsolete, throws'the baby out with
the bathwater. In our opinion, a better way to deal with the obsolescence problem
is to allow the plaintiff to raise the issue before the court when the defendant seeks
to assert regulatory compliance as a defense instead of rejecting the defense out of
hand.
Several other arguments have been made that are not directed against the
regulatory compliance defense as such, but instead rest on the notion that tort law
has certain advantages over government regulation and, therefore, tort liability
should not be cut back by "tort reform" measures such as the regulatory
206 See Johnson, supra note 198, at 1051-52.
207 Viscusi, supra note 167, at 39.
208 See Noah, supra note 171, at 2154-55.
209 See Schwartz, supra note 9, at 1150-51.
210Id. at 1151-52.
211Id. at 1152.
212 See Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 619 F.2d 499, 503
(5th Cir. 1980).
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compliance defense. Thus, as Professor Robert Rabin points out, tort litigation
provides a means of exposing corporate wrongdoing.1 3 For example, even though
breast implants were not ever scientifically linked to any major disease, pretrial
discovery revealed to the public that manufacturers of these products were
"anything but scrupulous in their concern for product safety or for marketing their
product in an honest fashion.,
214
Professor Rabin also observes that tort law, unlike government regulation,
provides a mechanism for compensating accident victims. 215 According to this
argument, regulatory agencies typically employ risk-benefit analysis to determine
an acceptable level of safety.21 6 By protecting individuals and businesses from tort
liability when they comply with government safety standards, a robust regulatory
compliance would place tort law in an efficiency-based straightjacket that ignores
other objectives, such as risk-spreading, that courts have traditionally invoked to
justify liability.217
Professor Rabin is undoubtedly correct that tort law, provides educational and
risk-spreading benefits that would be lost or reduced if a strong regulatory
compliance defense were adopted. However, the savings from the reduction of
unnecessary tort litigation associated with a strong regulatory compliance defense
greatly outweigh the educational benefits that the present tort law system provides.
Moreover, as Professor Lars Noah points out, even if courts adopt a strong
regulatory compliance defense, plaintiffs will still have a strong incentive to look
for evidence of noncompliance, nondisclosure or fraud in order to defeat the
regulatory compliance defense if the defendant attempts to assert it. 218 As far as the
"compensation gap" argument is concerned, risk-spreading may be a persuasive
rationale for imposing liability without fault in the law of products liability, but it
is less important in negligence law where the standard of care, based on the
Learned Hand formula, focuses on achieving an efficient level of safety rather than
spreading accident costs.
21 9
213 Rabin, supra note 6 at 2068-70; see also Elizabeth A. Weeks, Beyond
Compensation: Using Torts to Promote Public Health, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 27,
58 (2007) (concluding that tort litigation provides the public with information about
dangerous pharmaceutical products).
214 Rabin, supra note 6, at 2068.
215 Id. at 2070-74.
2 6 See id. at 2070-71.217 Id. at 2071.
218 Noah, supra note 171, at 2161-62.
219 We would also point out that defendants in negligence cases often have less risk-
spreading ability than product manufacturers. See infra Part V.B. (discussing how many
nursing homes have been forced out of business because they were unable to obtain
liability insurance at reasonable rates).
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V. NURSING HOME REGULATION: A CASE STUDY
A fire at the NHC nursing home facility in Nashville, Tennessee caused
sixteen deaths and a number of injuries, mostly from smoke inhalation. Thirty-two
plaintiffs filed lawsuits against NHC, seeking damages for injuries sustained in the
fire. In each case, the plaintiffs claimed NHC was negligent because it had failed to
retrofit the Nashville facility with sprinklers in each resident's room. Although
NHC had complied with all applicable safety regulations, it was forced the defend
against these claims in court. We believe the NHC experience illustrates the need
for a stronger regulatory compliance defense than the Third Restatement provides.
A. The Nursing Home Safety Regulations
The fire safety aspects of nursing home facilities are regulated by various
federal, state, and local governmental agencies. Title IV of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987 (OBRA),220 known as the Nursing Home Reform Act,
is the principal source of federal oversight.2 1 The federal statute is supplemented
by extensive regulations.222 Federal law regulates many aspects of nursing home
safety, including fire protection. For example, a provision of OBRA, entitled "Life
Safety Code," declares that "[a] skilled nursing facility must meet such provisions
of such edition (as specified by the Secretary in the regulations) of the Life Safety
Code of the National Fire Protection Association as are applicable to nursing
,,223homes. In addition, a federal regulation, states that "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this section ... the facility must meet the applicable provisions of the
2000 edition of the Life Safety Code of the National Fire Protection
Association.,
2 4
The State of Tennessee and the Metropolitan Government of Nashville also
regulate nursing home safety. In Tennessee, the state's Division of Health Care
Facilities is responsible for determining whether nursing home facilities comply
with applicable federal and state building and life safety regulations, including fire
safety regulations.225 To carry out this task, the Division of Health Care Facilities
220 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3, 1396r (2006).
221 See Jennifer Gimler Brady, Long-Term Care Under Fire: A Case for Rational
Enforcement, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1 11-17 (2001) (discussing OBRA);
Charles Grassley, Essay, The Resurrection of Nursing Home Reform: A Historical Account
of the Recent Revival of the Quality of Care Standards for Long-Term Care Facilities
Established in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, 7 ELDER L.J. 267, 270-274 (1999).
222 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.200-485.729 (2007).
223 42 U.S.C. § 1395i-3(d)(2)(B).
224 42 C.F.R. § 483.70(a)(1).
225 See TENN. CODE ANN. §.§ 68-11-201 to 1500 (2006); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS.
1200-8-11.01 to .14 (2007); Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs' Response in Opp. to
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summ. J. on Punitive Damages at 30, In re NHC-Nashville
Fire Litigation, No. 03-MDI (Davidson County Ct., Tenn. Oct. 9, 2006) (on file with
authors) [hereinafter NHC's Reply]; Affidavit of Katy Gammon 5-6, In re NHC-
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conducts annual surveys of each Tennessee nursing home facility and makes a
compliance determination based on those surveys.226 The regulations enforced in
the surveys are contained in various editions of the Life Safety Code.227
The Life Safety Code is a product of the NFPA, an advocate of fire prevention
and an authoritative source on fire safety.228 The mission of the NFPA and its
approximately 80,000 members is to "reduce the worldwide burden of fire and
other hazards on the quality of life by providing and advocating consensus codes
and standards, research, training, and education.' '229 As part of this mission, the
NFPA drafts and publishes the Life Safety Code. The NFPA generally publishes a
new edition of the Life Safety Code every three years. Each edition includes
requirements that are specifically applicable only to health care facilities like
nursing homes. Those requirements are divided in two distinct sets: those
applicable to nursing homes under construction and those applicable to existing
nursing homes. The NFPA studies, develops, revises, and updates safety standards
for each new edition of the Life Safety Code. In that way, the requirements in each
edition of the Life Safety Code reflect the NFPA's most recent determination about
what fire safety features are needed to provide an appropriate level of fire safety in
existing nursing homes.
Each edition of the Life Safety Code is developed through an open consensus
process accredited by ANSI.230 The individuals primarily responsible for
developing the Life Safety Code's requirements applicable to nursing homes are a
group of approximately twenty experts that comprise the NFPA Technical
Committee on Health Care Occupancies.231 The members of this committee have
diverse expertise and backgrounds in a variety of health care, fire, and life safety
fields, including several members who have a background in code enforcement.
2 32
Nashville Fire Litigation, No. 03-DMI (Davidson County Ct., Tenn. July 14, 2004) (on file
with authors) [hereinafter Gammon Aff.].
226 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1200-8-11.05(10).
227 See NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 40; Gammon Aff., supra note 225, 6, 9-11;
Deposition of James C. Chandler, In re NHC-Nashville Fire Litigation at 67-70, No. 03-
DMI (Davidson County Ct., Tenn. Apr. 14, 2005) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Chandler Dep.]; Deposition of Seth Afotey at 16, In re NHC-Nashville Fire Litigation, No.
03-DMI (Davidson County Ct., Tenn. Apr. 20, 2005) (on file with authors).
228 NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 39; Carson Aff. 4; see NFPA 101: LIFE SAFETY
CODE (National Fire Protection Agency 2006).
229 NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 39; Carson Aff. 4; National Fire Protection
Ass'n, http://www.nfpa.org (follow "About Us" hyperlink).
230 See NEC's Reply, supra note 225, at 40; Carson Aff. 15-21, 23; National Fire
Prevention Association, Codes and Standards, available at http://nfpa.org (follow "Codes
and Standards" hyperlink; then follow "Code Development Process" hyperlink).
231 See NFPA, COMPLETE LISTING OF NFPA TECHNICAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS,
CORRELATING COMMITTEE MEMBERS AND PANEL MEMBERS 222-27 (Rev. Jan. 2008).
232 Id. Of the seventeen members of the NFPA Technical Committee on Health Care
Occupancies that worked on the 2000 edition of the Life Safety Code, four members had a
background in code enforcement, six members represented entities subject to the code, two
members had a background in insurance, one member had a background in the manufacture
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The disparate expertise of committee members ensures that varied viewpoints and
interests are present in the committee, which produces standards and requirements
that represent a carefully considered consensus on fire and life safety issues.
2 33
The members of the Technical Committee on Health Care Occupancies use
their diverse expertise-along with numerous reports, studies, and suggested
provisions submitted by members of the NFPA and the public-to develop each
edition of the Life Safety Code's requirements applicable to health care facilities
like nursing homes. Specifically, the members of the Technical Committee work to
develop requirements that will, based on their expert determination, provide, fire
safety in nursing homes consistent with the public interest while avoiding
requirements that impose unreasonable hardships or unnecessary interference with
the normal use and occupancy of a nursing home or that force closure of a facility
due to unnecessary and unreasonable financial obligations.234 When considering
whether to include a provision requiring the installation of a particular fire safety
feature in a health care occupancy, the members of the Technical Committee on
Health Care Occupancies consider, among other things, the potential life-saving
capabilities of the feature, the cost of installing the feature, the interference or
inconvenience with health care operations likely to be caused by the feature, and
the history of fire accidents, injuries, or deaths in health care facilities with and
without the feature.235
Once the Technical Committee on Health Care Occupancies prepares a new
edition of the Life Safety Code standards applicable to healthcare facilities like
nursing homes, the revised edition of the code is submitted to the entire
membership of the NFPA who vote to ratify or reject the committee's
recommended draft. Because the requirements in the Life Safety Code are
developed through this open consensus process, each edition of the Life Safety
Code reflects the collective determination of the diverse experts who comprise the
Technical Committee on Health Care Occupancies and the collective wisdom and
experience of the entire NFPA membership about what requirements are necessary
to provide a reasonable level of safety to life in the event of a fire in a nursing
home.236
of fire safety devices, and four members were "special experts" without a connection to
any specific facet of the fire and life safety field, but having special expertise on the issue
of life and fire safety in health care facilities. NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 40,
Affidavit of Thomas W. Jaeger, P.E., 8, In re NHC-Nashville Fire Litigation, No. 03-
DMI (Davidson County Ct., Tenn. Aug. 18, 2006) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Jaeger
Aff.]; Carson Aff. $ 17-19.
233 NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 40; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232, 8; Carson Aff.
17-19.
234 NEC's Reply, supra note 225, at 41; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232, 21.
235 NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 81; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232, 9 29, 338;
Carson Aff. 26-27.236 NEC's Reply, supra note 225, at 40; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232, 7.
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At least thirty states have incorporated portions of the Life Safety Code into
their regulatory or statutory systems. 237 Both the State of Tennessee and the
Federal Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) have, as part of their
regulatory schemes, adopted different editions of the Life Safety Code's
requirements applicable to nursing homes. Despite some perceived problems with
enforcement, the Life Safety Code has significantly improved nursing home safety
since CMS first adopted the Code's requirements in 1967. The fire loss history for
all nursing homes in the United States since that time can be used as a measure of
the effectiveness of the Life Safety Code's requirements because, due to
participation in Medicare or Medicaid programs, the overwhelming majority of
nursing homes in the United States (at least 98%) are required to comply with the
Life Safety Code, as adopted by the CMS.
238
Since CMS first adopted the Life Safety Code, the number of deaths at
nursing homes throughout the country has dropped dramatically. For example, in
the five years from 1966 through 1970, there were an average of 15.2 deaths in
nursing homes every year that were cause by multiple-death nursing home fires.239
In contrast, for the five-year period prior to 2003, there were no multiple-death
nursing home fires in the entire United States. In fact, for the entire twenty-year
period prior to 2003-during which various editions of the Life Safety Code were
being enforced as part of CMS regulation of nursing homes across the country-
there was only an average of approximately one death per year at nursing homes
throughout the entire country caused by multiple-death fires.240 This is an
impressive fire safety record considering the fact that during the twenty years prior
to 2003, there were approximately 17,000,000 nursing home residents across the
country. This fire history shows the remarkable effectiveness of CMS' adoption
and regulation of nursing homes throughout the United States pursuant to the Life
Safety Code's requirements and strongly suggests that the Life Safety Code
provides a reasonable standard of fire safety for nursing homes.
237 See News Release, National Fire Protection Agency, State of Vermont Adopts
2003 Editions of NFPA1, Uniform Fire Code and NFPA 101, Life Safety Code (Nov. 15,
2005), available at http://www.nfpa.org (follow "Press Room" hyperlink; then follow
"2005" hyperlink).
238 See NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 43; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232, T 20.
239 For these purposes, a "multiple-death nursing home fire" is a fire at a nursing
home resulting in more than two fatalities. This definition is used because sprinklers and
other fire protection features in nursing homes cannot be expected to prevent fatal fire
injuries inflicted on someone very close to the starting point of a fire, such as those in the
room of a fire's origin. NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 38; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232,
21; Carson Aff. 11.
240 NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 43; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232, 77 15-16, 21-
22; Carson Aff. $ 11.
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B. The Effect of Tort Liability on the Nursing Home Industry
Notwithstanding the fact that nursing homes are subject to a comprehensive
regulatory regime, the nursing home industry has been subjected to an increasing
number of tort claims in recent years. 24 Nursing homes are now sued at a rate of
14.5 lawsuits per thousand beds, a rate which doubled in 5 years' time.242 The size
of the average damage zfward or settlement has increased as well. According to one
account, the average claim paid has risen to $200,000.243 This increased liability
exposure has also caused nursing home insurance premiums to increase
substantially.244 Insurance premiums rose by 150% nationally between 1998 and
2000.245 Nursing homes in some areas of the country have experienced even
greater increases in their insurance premiums. For example, insurance premiums
have risen 300% for some Pennsylvania nursing homes.246 The situation is even
worse in California and Florida, states with the largest and second-largest
populations of elderly persons. 47 In California, the price of insurance rose from
$125 per bed for $1 million in coverage in 2000 to $1100 per bed in 2002.248 The
cost of liability insurance in Florida is even higher, having risen to $7000 per
bed.249 Furthermore, losses from tort claims have caused at least ten liability
insurers to leave Florida or stop underwriting new business altogether in that
state.250 For similar reasons, nursing homes in Texas are also beginning to
experience problems with the cost and availability of insurance coverage.25'
The rising cost of insuring against tort liability threatens the financial
solvency of the nursing home industry. 252 For example, in a recent twelve-month
period, "more than 1,600 of the nation's 17,000 nursing homes.., filed for
bankruptcy ' '253 and other nursing home operators have been forced to sell their
241 See Marshall B. Kapp, Resident Safety and Medical Errors in Nursing Homes:
Reporting and Disclosure in a Culture of Mutual Mistrust, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 51, 68-69
(2003).
242 Richard H. Tilghman IV, Note, Rethinking Constitutional Limitations on Punitive
Damages: Providing Economically Efficient Incentives to Prevent Nursing Home Abuse,
54 DEPAUL L. REv. 1007, 1011 (2005).
243 Id.
244 Kapp, supra note 241, at 70.
245 See R. Patrick Bedell, Note, The Next Frontier in Tort Reform: Promoting the
Financial Solvency of Nursing Homes, 11 ELDER L.J. 361, 369 (2003).
246 Tilghman IV, supra note 242, at 1011-12.
247 See Terrance J. Shanahan, Comment, Statutory Limits on Punitive Damages in
Nursing Home Negligence Tort Actions: Preventing the Collapse of the Private Nursing
Home, 4 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 373, 379 (2001).
248 Bedell, supra note 245, at 369.
249 Id. at 369.
2
10 Id. at 368.
251 Shanahan, stgpra note 247, at 383-84.
252 See Bedell, supra note 245, at 368-69.
253 Id. at 367-68.
[No. I
2008] THE CASE FOR A STRONG REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DEFENSE 147
properties because of rising liability costs. 254 Not only does excessive tort liability
have a negative impact on nursing home owners, it also harms nursing home
residents and the public by forcing nursing homes to raise their fees.255 Obviously,
nursing home patients bear some of these higher costs, but because Medicaid pays
for more than half of the cost of nursing home care in the United States,
256
taxpayers also feel the effects of increased damage awards and liability insurance
premiums.
C. The NHC Nursing Home Fire
At 10:17 p.m. on September 25, 2003, a fire alarm sounded at the nursing
home facility in Nashville, Tennessee. The fire originated and was contained.
within one resident's room, but due to the fire department's forty-five-minute
delay in extinguishing the fire, it generated a tremendous amount of smoke. All of
the 217 residents living in the facility had to be evacuated. Twenty-two of these
residents suffered from smoke inhalation and injuries during their evacuations and
at least sixteen residents died as a result of smoke inhalation.
1. The Life Safety Code's Sprinkler Regulations
Following the fire, thirty-two plaintiffs filed lawsuits against NHC, seeking
damages for injuries sustained in the fire. Each of these lawsuits claimed that NHC
was negligent because it failed to install sprinklers in the Nashville facility.
Although NHC had installed numerous fire safety features in its Nashville
building, at the time of the fire none of the applicable federal, state, and local
safety regulations required the installation of sprinklers. In fact, just months prior
to the fire, inspectors for the State of Ternessee has found the NHC Nashville
facility to be in compliance with all requirements of the Life Safety Code.
257
Accordingly, a critical issue in the claims filed against NHC was whether NHC
could be held liable under principles of common-law negligence for not installing
sprinklers in its facility when those sprinklers were not required under any
applicable building or fire safety regulation and when th- facility had been found
to be in full compliance with the applicable provisions of the Life Safety Code just
months prior to the fire.
It is important to reiterate that no edition of the Life Safety Code adopted by
the NFPA prior to the fire at the NHC Nashville facility contained any provision
that would require sprinklers to be installed in existing nursing homes of the same
254 Tilghman IV, supra note 242, at 1011.
255 See Bedell, supra note 245, at 378.
256 Kapp, supra note 241, at 55.
257 NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 31; Gammon Aff., supra note 225, 7;
Deposition of Katy Gammon at 29-30, In re NHC-Nashville Fire Litigation, No. 03-DMI
(Davidson County Ct., Tenn. Dec. 14-15, 2004) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Gammon Dep. II]; Chandler Dep., supra note 227, at 58.
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construction type as the NHC Nashville facility. 8 The lack of a requirement
mandating sprinklers in existing nursing homes was not an oversight on part of the
NFPA. Instead, the Technical Committee on Health Care Occupancies expressly
considered and rejected proposals for such a requirement during its process of
developing each of the 1991, 1994, 1997, and 2000 editions of the Life Safety
Code. 9 On each occasion, the Technical Committee rejected the proposals
because the good fire safety history at nursing homes and other health care
facilities, along with the fire safety provided by the requirements already included
in the Life Safety Code, did not justify the additional burden and cost that would
be caused by mandating the installation of sprinklers in existing nursing homes.26°
In other words, experts on fire safety, on at least four separate occasions prior to
the fire at the NHC Nashville facility concluded that, although sprinklers might
provide some additional level of fire safety, the safety features already required by
the Life Safety Code provided a reasonable and appropriate level of fire safety and
the risk posed by the lack of sprinklers in existing nursing homes was not
substantial enough to justify the burden of installing sprinklers in those facilities.261
At the time of the Nashville fire, approximately 25% or about 4200 of the
nursing homes in the United States did not have sprinklers in resident rooms.262
Based on a 2002 study, the aggregate cost of installing automatic fire sprinklers in
existing nursing homes was conservatively estimated at approximately $1 billion.
This cost was one of the factors the Technical Committee on Health Care
Occupancies considered when deciding not to adopt a requirement in the Life
Safety Code mandating the installation of sprinklers in all existing nursing homes.
2. The Litigation Experience
The plaintiffs and NHC agreed to mediate the various cases filed in
connection with the Nashville fire. Prior to the mediation, some of the authors, as
NHC's counsel, researched comment (a) to § 288C of the Second Restatement and
hired another of the authors as an academic expert in the regulatory compliance
field in order to formulate the argument for a strong regulatory compliance
defense. Together, we drafted a partial summary judgment motion on the issue. We
expected the plaintiffs to discount the argument and respond that, under the
traditional approach, the regulations should be seen as "minimum standards." Still,
we hoped that the regulatory compliance argument would give the plaintiffs'
lawyers pause and that, once studied, the court could be persuaded to adopt the
kind of tort reform suggested by a strong regulatory compliance defense.
258 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-235 (2006).
259 NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 81; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232,. 7 29-30;
Carson Aff. M 26-28.
260 NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 81; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232, 7 29, 33;
Carson Aff. 77 26-27.
261 NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 81; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232, 77 29, 33;
Carson Aff. $T 26-27.
262 NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 79; Jaeger Aff., supra note 232, 31.
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The briefing was filed in advance of the mediation and was available for the
benefit of the mediator and the plaintiffs' lawyers. The strong regulatory
compliance argument, along with the comparative fault arguments, were
effectively used in settlement negotiations. The cases ultimately were resolved
before the court ruled on the motion for partial summary judgment on the
defendant's regulatory compliance defense.
D. The Nashville Fire Litigation and the Role of Regulatory Compliance
The following characteristics of the nursing home industry are relevant to the
regulatory compliance issue. First, nursing homes are subject to a rigorous and
comprehensive regulatory regime. Second, the agencies that regulate nursing
homes must make trade-offs between safety and other considerations. Finally, the
nursing home industry has very high social utility but is also vulnerable to
excessive tort liability.
1. "Optimal" Safety Standards
Tort liability imposes significant economic costs, with few offsetting benefits,
when the regulatory regime is already adequate. We believe this to be the case with
nursing home regulation. As described above, the Life Safety Code's safety
standards are developed by NFPA through an open consensus process so that they
reflect the opinion of the members of the Technical Committee on Health Care
Occupancies and the entire NFPA membership.263 Furthermore, these safety
standards are reviewed by the NFPA every three years with each new edition of the
Life Safety Code. These safety standards applied to NHC's Nashville facility as
well as other nursing homes in Tennessee. Representing the collective expertise of
the NFPA members, these standards could hardly be called "minimal." Rather,
they are about as close to "optimal" or "state of the art" as it is possible to get.
Therefore, from the perspective of regulatory efficiency, it is doubtful that tort
liability is capable of providing any significant degree of incremental safety
beyond that which can already be achieved by enforcement of the Life Safety
Code. Unfortunately, in this case, there was a very real possibility that lay juries
would have ignored existing safety standards and, in effect, imposed higher safety
standards on NHC if the lawsuits filed against it had gone to trial.
This risk of tort liability imposes a financial hardship on nursing homes either
by inducing them to spend additional money to achieve minimal increases in safety
or by forcing them to pay large damage awards if juries conclude that they were
negligent for not installing safety features beyond those required by the applicable
codes. In addition, when juries impose tort liability upon businesses that have
complied with existing safety regulations, they force them to reduce expenditures
for other purposes. In the nursing home context, this means that nursing home
owners must spend money to achieve marginal increases in fire safety instead of
263 See infra notes 225-240 and accompanying text.
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devoting more resources toward improving the quality of life of nursing home
residents.
2. Regulatory Trade-offs
Agencies that formulate administrative regulations frequently must balance
safety goals against other considerations. 264 The drafters of the Life Safety Code
made these sorts of trade-offs when they formulated sprinkler requirements for
existing nursing home facilities. On several occasions, NFPA's Technical
Committee on Health Care Occupancies considered whether it should require
existing nursing homes to install sprinkler systems. Each time, it decided that the
safety features already required by the Life Safety Code appeared to provide a
reasonable level of fire safety, and therefore, that the risk posed by the lack of
-sprinklers in existing nursing homes was not substantial enough to justify the
burden of installing sprinklers in those facilities. 265 Trade-offs, such as the decision
to exempt existing nursing homes from the obligation to install sprinklers, are a
necessary and legitimate part of the regulatory process. However, the integrity of
these regulatory trade-offs will be seriously compromised if juries are permitted to
ignore them in tort cases. A robust regulatory compliance defense will help to
prevent this from happening.
3. The Effect of Tort Liability on Socially Useful Enterprises
Nursing homes have high social utility. However, as we have seen, the
financial health of nursing homes and other socially desirable enterprises is
threatened by the prospect of excessive tort liability. In the Nashville fire litigation,
for example, even though these cases were eventually settled, the settlement
awards and litigation expenses were substantial. In addition, the tort liability
problem is exacerbated by the risk of punitive damages. For example, many
plaintiffs in the Nashville fire litigation sought millions of dollars in punitive
damages. Had the plaintiffs prevailed in their request at trial, the financial effects
of multiple punitive damage awards would have been devastating. Furthermore,
even though these cases did not go to trial, the prospect of punitive damage
liability increased the pressure on NHC to settle and may have even influenced the
size of the settlement awards. Again, this experience indicated that courts should
reject the traditional regulatory compliance analysis in favor of a rule that protects
nursing home and other socially useful enterprises from the risk of being wiped out
by tort claims.
264 See Noah, supra note 171, at 2163.
265 Within days after the fire, NHC committed to retrofit all of its facilities with
sprinklers and also agreed to support legislation requiring that sprinklers be retrofitted.
Tennessee's legislature subsequently enacted such legislation. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-
11-235 (2006).
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VI. REVISING THE TRADITIONAL REGULATORY COMPLIANCE DOCTRINE
We have concluded that courts in negligence cases should give considerably
more weight to standards of care that are embodied in modem statutes, ordinances,
and administrative regulations. The NHC nursing home fire litigation provides
some insight into how a more robust regulatory compliance defense should be
formulated. In particular, the NHC experience suggests that if a regulatoiy
compliance defense is to be useful, a defendant must be able to assert the defense
early in the litigation process. A regulatory compliance defense that takes the form
of an evidentiary presumption or a jury instruction makes its appearance too late in
the proceedings to do the defendant much good.
A. A Proposed Alternative to the Third Restatement § 16
We suggest the following alternative to the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical Harm § 16:
(1) An actor is not negligent if the actor complies with a pertinent
statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation that is designed to
protect against the type of accident that occurred and if the victim is
within the class of persons the statute, ordinance, or administrative
regulation is designed to protect. If the court finds that these
conditions are satisfied, it 'shall rule as a matter of law that the
actor's compliance with the statute, ordinance or administrative
regulation constitutes reasonable care.
(2) In any action for personal injury or damage to property against an
actor who has been issued or granted a license or permit by a
federal, state, or local government entity or administrative agency,
unless the victim can show by clear and convincing evidence that
the license or permit was issued or granted as the result of fraud, the
court shall rule that the license or permit holder has complied with
all safety standards and requirements specified for the issuance of
the permit or license.
(3) Whenever a federal, state, or local government entity or
administrative agency has conducted an inspection of the actor's
business premises to determine whether the actor is in compliance
with a particular regulation or safety standard, unless the victim can
show by clear and convincing evidence that the actor was guilty of
fraud or fraudulent concealment in connection with the inspection,
the court shall rule that the actor was in compliance with the
applicable regulation or safety standard at the time of the injury if:
(a) the inspector found that the actor was in compliance with the
applicable permit requirement or safety standard and the inspection
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was conducted no more than one year before the injury occurred, or
(b) if the regulatory entity or agency has certified that the actor was
in compliance with the permit requirement or safety standard at the
time the injury occurred.
B. Commentary on Proposed Changes
This proposal is substantially different from the Third Restatement's
formulation. Unlike the Restatement, which declares in the black letter text that
regulatory compliance is merely evidence of reasonable care,266 our proposal
requires courts to rule as a matter of law that compliance with governmental
regulations constitutes reasonable care if it finds that the statute, ordinance, or
regulation is designed to protect against the type of accident that occurred and that
the victim is within the class of persons the statute, ordinance, or regulation is
designed to protect. In addition, unlike the Restatement, our proposal provides that
a permit holder will be deemed to be in compliance with all applicable permit
requirements or safety standards, thereby preventing plaintiffs from making
collateral attacks on the agency's decision to grant the license or permit. Finally,
when a regulatory agency has inspected a defendant's business premises to
determine whether it is in compliance with a particular regulation or safety
standard, the court shall prevent a plaintiff from challenging the agency's finding
of compliance if the inspector has concluded that the defendant was in compliance
with the applicable requirement or standard and the inspection. was conducted no
more than one year before the injury occurred or if the regulatory agency certifies
that the actor was in compliance with the permit requirement or safety standard at
the time the injury occurred.
1. Government Regulations as Standards of Care
The Third Restatement's general rule is that regulatory compliance is
normally nothing more thian evidence of reasonable care.267 This, of course, means
that the question of whether a regulatory standard constitutes reasonable care will
usually be left to the jury. Only in comment (f) do the drafters of the Restatement
suggest that a court may sometimes take this question away from the jury and rule
as a matter of law that compliance with a regulatory safety standard268 satisfies a
defendant's duty of reasonable care. In our opinion, this approach does not provide
enough protection to defendants who comply in good faith with meaningful safety
regulations. As the Nashville nursing home fire litigation illustrates, it is essential
from the defendant's point of view to obtain a definitive -ruling on the regulatory
compliance issue at an early stage in the proceedings. If the resolution of this issue
266 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 16 (Proposed
Final Draft 2007).
267 See id.
268Id. § 16 cmt. f.
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is left until the trial, the cost of litigation for both parties will be greater and the
settlement negotiations will be more protracted and difficult. In addition, a ruling
in the defendant's favor early in the litigation will also remove the threat of
punitive damages.
In order to achieve this objective, however, a defendant must be able to
invoke the regulatory compliance defense sometime before, during, or immediately
after discovery by means of a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment. However, for a defendant to raise a regulatory compliance defense at-
this stage of the proceedings, the defense must not be too fact specific. As
mentioned earlier, the Restatement's version of the regulatory compliance defense
is so open-ended that it would be difficult for a defendant to successfully invoke it
prior to trial. In contrast, our proposal limits factual issues to whether the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was designed to protect against the type of accident that
occurred and if the victim was within the class of persons the statute, ordinance or
regulation was designed to protect. In most instances, a court should be able to
resolve these questions by examining the statute, ordinance, or regulation in
question, as well as other documents, and by reviewing affidavits of government
officials and expert witnesses obtained during discovery.
2. Disputes About Compliance
In the Nashville nursing home fire case, when NHC revealed that it would
assert a regulatory compliance defense in a motion for partial summary judgment,
some of the plaintiffs' attorneys responded that summary judgment on this issue
should not be granted because NHC did not comply with all of the requirements of
the Life Safety Code.269 If plaintiffs were allowed to allege noncompliance without
any substantial factual support, they could prevent defendants from invoking the
regulatory compliance defense early in the litigation process. The compliance issue
would then be treated as one of fact to be resolved by the jury at trial. To prevent
plaintiffs from taking advantage of this tactic, our proposal limits their ability to
defeat motions for summary judgment by alleging lack of compliance with
regulatory requirements. This makes it easier for a court to rule on the regulatory
compliance issue as a matter of law instead of leaving the question of regulatory
compliance to the jury.
A similar rationale applies to situations where an employee of a regulatory
agency has inspected the defendant's business premises to determine whether it is
in compliance with applicable safety standards. Under our proposal, absent fraud, a
determination by the agency that the defendant is in compliance, when made
during an inspection of the defendant's business premises, shall be conclusive and,
therefore immune from collateral attack by plaintiffs in a tort action.
Finally, our proposal contains a very narrow "fraud exception" to the
regulatory compliance defense. There is no fraud exception to the safety standards
themselves. We believe that the likelihood of fraud is nonexistent when safety
269 See NHC's Reply, supra note 225, at 101.
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standards are formulated and approved by national standard-setting organizations
in proceedings that are open and transparent. On the other hand, plaintiffs may
allege fraud in connection with the issuance of licenses or in connection with
inspections by employees of administrative agencies. However, in such cases,
allegations of fraud must be specific and must be supported by clear and
convincing evidence. This standard will prevent a plaintiff from defending against
a motion for summary judgment by making generalized and unsupported claims of
fraud. We believe that a clear and convincing evidentiary standard is appropriate
because this is the prevailing standard in civil fraud cases.27°
C. Other Issues
1. Regulatory Compliance and Negligence Per Se
Under the common-law doctrine of negligence per se, the court adopts the
provisions of a statute or administrative regulation as the standard of care in a
negligence case. 271 Thus, the unexcused violation of a relevant safety statute or
administrative regulation constitutes negligence as a matter of law.272 In § 14, the
drafters of the Third Restatement codify the negligence per se doctrine as follows:
"An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor violates a statute that is
designed to protect against the type of accident the actor's conduct causes, and if
the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute is designed to
protect.273
One might ask whether our proposal treats the doctrine of negligence per se
and the regulatory compliance defense similarly. Both § 16 of the Third
Restatement, which deals with regulatory compliance, and § 14, which is
concerned with negligence per se, rely on statutes and regulations to provide
guidance as to the applicable standard of care. However, under the Third
Restatement, the procedural effect of violation of a statute is quite different from
that of compliance with a statute. As comment (c) to § 14 points out, an unexcused
violation of a statute or regulation is not merely evidence of negligence, it is
conclusive on the standard of care issue.274 On the other hand, § 16 of the
Restatement declares that compliance with a statute is merely evidence of
reasonable care.275 The rationale for this disparate treatment is that statutory
standards are minimal rather than optimal; therefore, violation of such standards is
obviously negligent, while compliance does not necessarily constitute reasonable
270 See Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Mo. 1996); Riley
Hill Gen. Contractor v. Tandy Corp., 737 P.2d 595, 605 (Or. 1987).
271 See Costa, supra note 205, at 54.
272 See Noah, supra note 171, at 2151.
273 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 (Proposed
Final Draft 2007).274 Id. § 14 cmt. c.
275Id. § 16.
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care. 276 In contrast, our proposal treats these doctrines similarly in the sense that it
requires courts to defer to legislative and administrative safety standards when
determining the applicable standard of care.
2. Punitive Damages
Our proposal deals with the effect of regulatory compliance on a defendant's
liability for compensatory damages and does not expressly address the effect of
such compliance on punitive damage awards. Unlike compensatory damages,
which are intended to compensate a plaintiff for injuries suffered because of the
defendant's tortious conduct, punitive damages are intended to punish a defendant
for serious wrongdoing and to deter others from acting in a similar manner.277
There are several reasons why we failed to discuss the issue of punitive
damages earlier. First, under our proposal, compliance with government safety
standards, in most cases, conclusively establishes that a defendant has exercised
reasonable care and, therefore is not negligent. Since punitive damages cannot be
awarded unless the defendant is held liable for compensatory damages, it follows
that under our proposal compliance with government safety standards would
protect a defendant from liability for punitive as well as compensatory damages.
Second, our proposal is based on the principle that government safety
standards should determine the duty of reasonable care in common-law negligence
actions. Compliance with government safety standards and liability for punitive
damages, however, involves consideration of factors other than reasonable care.278
We felt that injecting such issues as malice or reckless indifference to the rights of
others into our proposal would only confuse matters. That having been said, we are
aware that a number of states have concluded that compliance with government
safety standards, while not sufficient to protect against liability for compensatory
damages, will preclude liability for punitive damages, at least in some cases.279
Consequently, we will briefly consider why punitive damages are inappropriate
when a defendant has complied in good faith with applicable safety standards.
First of all, even if safety standards are not optimal, good faith compliance
with them would still be inconsistent with the type of intent that is necessary to
impose punitive damages.28° Under this rationale, regulatory compliance would
protect a defendant from liability except when agency approval has been obtained
by fraud or some other illegal conduct. Furthermore, since punitive damages are
quasi-criminal in nature, there are additional policy considerations that may
proscribe an award of punitive damages when defendants have complied with
276 See Rabin, supra note 6, at 2051.
277 See Warren, supra note 26, at 809.
278 See OWEN, supra note 189, § 18.6, at 1204-05.
279 E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-22(b), 300aa-23(d) (2006) (childhood vaccines); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2946(5) (LexisNexis
2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5c (West 2000); OHIo REV. CODE ANN § 2307.80(C)(1)
(LexisNexis 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.927 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-2 (2002).280 See Stone Man, Inc. v. Green, 435 S.E.2d 205, 206 (Ga. 1993).
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applicable government safety standards. One such concern is that imposing
punitive damages on individuals and businesses that have followed the law
undermines confidence in the competence of regulatory agencies and arguably
creates problems with enforcement. If faithful adherence to safety standards duly
promulgated by a regulatory agency results in quasi-criminal punishment, there is
less incentive to obey these standards in the first place.
A related issue is lack of notice to a defendant when prescribed conduct is
defined by vague liability formulas instead of specific rules set forth by a
regulatory agency. Common-law liability standards employ such terms as
"malice," ill will," "fraud," and "oppression" or call for the assessment of punitive
damages for conduct that is "wanton," "reckless," or involves "conscious disregard
or indifference toward the interests of others. ' 81 Unfortunately, these words and
phrases provide little guidance to regulated parties as to what conduct will be
sanctioned and what conduct will not.282 For example, an administrative regulation
that declares that sprinkler systems are required in new construction but not in
existing nursing homes provides a clear standard for nursing home operators to
follow. On the other hand, if compliance with this standard does not provide a safe
harbor against punitive damages, owners of existing nursing homes will be left to
speculate on whether a jury will consider its failure to install sprinkler systems to
be "wanton," "reckless," or "malicious. 283
A third concern with punitive damages is that of disproportionate punishment.
This is a problem that affects punitive damages generally. Recently the United
States Supreme Court has begun to scrutinize punitive damage awards in terms of
constitutional due process principles to determine when they are excessive.284
Although this form of federal oversight may put a damper on excessively high
punitive damage awards, this is still a matter of concern, especially when the
defendant has complied with applicable safety standards. Since a defendant who
has complied in good faith with government safety standards is usually much less
281 Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in
Product Liability Litigation, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 46 (1985-86) (citations omitted).
282 See OWEN, supra note 189, § 18.5, at 1185.
283 Ausness, supra note 281, at 46. In addition to the notice problem described above,
there is an equal protection problem because different juries may disagree as to whether
punitive damages are warranted under these various formulations. Thus, the same conduct
may result in punitive damages in one case, but not in another.
284 E.g. Philip Morris v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). See generally Laura J. Hines,
Due Process Limitations on Punitive Damages: Why State Farm Won't Be the Last Word,
37 AKRON L. REV. 779 (2004) (discussing emerging case law on punitive damages); A.
Benjamin Spencer, Due Process and Punitive Damages: The Error of Federal
Excessiveness Jurisprudence, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1085 (2006) (discussing defects in
punitive damage jurisprudence); Garrett T. Charon, Note, Beyond a Bar of Double-Digit
Ratios: State Farm v. Campbell's Impact on Punitive Damage Awards, 70 BROOK. L. REV.
605 (2005-06) (discussing Campbell's single digit ratio requirement).
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culpable than other types of defendants, it would seem that any punitive damage
award would be disproportionate to the defendant's wrongdoing. Finally, the
prospect of overdeterrence militates against awarding punitive damages when a
defendant has complied with regulatory safety standards. If the fear of large
compensatory awards is sufficient to cause some businesses to skew their safety-
related expenditures, it is likely that the threat of punitive damages will result in
even greater misallocations of resources.285
All of this suggests that a strong argument can be made for developing a
regulatory compliance defense that protects those who comply with government
safety standards against punitive damages liability. However, for the most part, the
case for applying a regulatory compliance defense to punitive damage claims rests
on different rationales than we have invoked to support our proposal for a robust
regulatory compliance defense against compensatory damage claims.
VII. CONCLUSION
The NHC case illustrates how good-faith compliance with applicable safety
regulations currently provides businesses with insufficient protection against tort
liability. This is because the traditional rule that governs compliance with
government regulations is too weak. In effect, most courts treat a defendant's
compliance with governmental regulations as evidence of due care, but allow the
jury to find that a defendant was negligent, notwithstanding his or her compliance
with legislative or administrative regulations. The Third Restatement continues this
approach.
In contrast, we believe that courts should give more deference to safety
regulations that are promulgated by legislative bodies and administrative agencies.
Not only are these standards usually optimal rather than minimal in nature, but
they often represent important policy choices by the legislative and executive
branches of government that should be respected by the courts.
We have proposed an alternative regulatory compliance defense that is more
appropriate for activities, such as nursing homes, that are subject to regulation
under comprehensive, modem safety standards. Accordingly, we recommend that
the current version of the Restatement (Third) of Torts § 16: Liability for Physical
Harm be replaced by a regulatory compliance provision that resembles our
proposal.
285 See Ausness, supra note 281, at 86-92 (discussing the excessive deterrent effects
of punitive damages in the context of products liability).
